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'We repeat the view we expressed a year ago - namely that the
Broederbond is an arrogant, self-chosen elite, operating by
stealth and intrigue, its early cultural aspirations swamped
by its neo-Fascist ideas on race and colour. It Is a cancerous
growth in the living body of South Africa and as such its
influence is deadly,1 (1)
'The Bond is a service organisation intended to serve the
Afrikaner. Its sphere of operations is the work of the
Afrikaner people as a separate historical, Protestant-
Christian language and cultural community. The activities
with which the Bond occupies itself from time to time are
determined by the needs of the Afrikaner people at that
historical moment*' (2)
A secret society with the professed aim of the 'promotion of all the
interests of the Afrikaner nation1, (3) the Afrikaner Broederbond (hereafter
the A.fi, or Bond) has long been the bogeyman of South African politics. Its
operations are attacked as detailed and lurid conspiracies, and defended as the
Innocent, confidential actions of public-spirited men. In the process, though
much authoritative data on the Bond exists, its nature, functions and role have
been thoroughly mystified. At the outset it must be stated that the A.B. haa
exerted a profound influence at all levels of South African politics. This
paper attempts the beginnings of a demystification of the Bond's operations and
an assessmenfof its role up till 1948, Given its secret nature, this Is
necessarily sketchy and schematic. Yet such an assessment requires more than
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an examination of conflicting claims about the Broederbond, but demands its
situation within the broader context of Afrikaner Nationalism in South Africa,
As a political, social and ideological phenomenon, Afrikaner Nationalism
has itself been persistently mystified by both its academic proponents and opponents*
One group has sought to create political/cultural mythology, (4) and other ogres. (5)
Many non-Afrikaner historians have failed to read, or at least take seriously, what
Afrikaners write about themselves - how Afrikaner idealogues and commentators have
sought to interpret the world for the volk - relying instead on the hackneyed
interpretations of the political opponents of Afrikaner Nationalism. (6) Ironically,
this has produced a mirror image of its ideological assumptions. Almost without
exception, studies of Afrikaner Nationalism have accepted the social categories
inherent in the ideology! they have failed to query the Ideological premise that
ethnic/racial/cultural categories constitute the natural and sole units of social
action in South Africa, where social classes 'are not meaningful social realities'. (7)
Explanation remains rooted in ideas and ideology, themselves aspects of social action
but hardly its explanation. By taking as given precisely that which requires
explanation - the primacy of ethnic/racial/cultural categories - Afrikaner Nationalism
is presented as a monolithic political, social and ideological phenomenon, and
explained in a highly circular fashion as either the product of culture itself, or
the collective psychology of a culturally pre-defined group, 'Afrikanerdom*.
I know of no attempt to explore the generation, development and acquisition of the
cultural values of Afrikaner Nationalism, nor the interaction in the process of idea-
creation between leaders and masses. These critical questions cannot be merely taken
as given or self-explanatory* (8) This is no mere carping. If these questions
are explored, Afrikaner Nationalism soon ceases to be a monolithic response by an
undifferentiated 'Afrikanerdom1, but emerges as the often surprisingly flexible
reaction of specific class forces to the pressures of capitalist development.
Through the location of Afrikaans-speakers in the material world of the South African
social formation in all its historical phases of development, different patterns
of relation to the means of production are immediately apparent. The exploration
of their effects illuminates the gradual development, and careful cultivation by
specific groups, of an ideological and political matrix which could apparently
articulate and coordinate their varying responses to the pressures of capitalist
development.
bx> <*rIt. is suggested thep that only through an infusion of the categories of
social classican Afrikaner Nationalism be demystified and the acquisition and
operation of ideologies fully grasped. (9) It is in this context that a study of
the A.B. as a class organisation Is critical, not only in the de-conspiratorialisa-
tion of itself, but, given its leading role, as a demystlflcation of Afrikaner
Nationalism as well. It will be argued that during the period under review. the*
A.B, was a purely petty bourgeois organisation, rooted in the Northern provinces
of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and concerned with the particular effects
of the trajectory of capitalist development on the Afrikaans-speaking fraction of
the petty bourgeoisie. Once these were eased through the mobilisation of support
from other Afrikaans-speaking class forces and the use of State power, the nature
of the A.B. changed. Itself wracked with conflict between these competing class
forces, it lost its vanguard position. (10)
The Bond grew out of a grouping calling itself Jonfi Suid Afrika (Young
South Africa) formed early in 1918. In June of that year it changed its name
to the Afrikaner Broederbond (literally, the Afrikaner Brotherhood). It was a
time of political crisis and depression - 'Afrikanerdom was burning in hellfire*.
The 1913 split in the South African Party produced confusion and bitterness among
Afrikaners, particularly in the Northern provinces. This was compounded by the
violent suppression of the Rebellle, the execution of Joupie Fourie and the imprison-
ment of its leaders by the Botha government. Agriculture was depressed, the
influenza epidemic raged,and the squeeze on land and effects of the Rebellie
drove increasing numbers of rural whites into the cities, compounding the problem
of 'poor whiteism1. All writings on the Bond stress the significance of this
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pertod, when 'politically and economically the Afrikaner had been reduced to a
slave in the land of his birth* • (11) These conditions generated many organised
responses. In the Free State, General Hertzog had formed the Nationalist Party,
followed by the formation of similar parties in the Transvaal and Cape. The
Helpmekaar (Mutual Aid) organisation was conceived to pay the fines of the
imprisoned leaders of the Kebellie, and its mobilisation of the savings of
Afrikaans-speakers was partly to inspire the formation of the two future insurance
giants, San tam and San lam. The growth of the cooperative movement similarly dates
from this period. In the Cape, the cultural nationalism of the language movement
was given political and economic muscle. In three full years a handful of Cape
Town and Stellenbosch professional men formed Die Naaionale Per3 (National Press),
the Cape Nationalist Party, and Santam and Sanlam. (12) But the Western Cape
was little affected by the economic and political crises which wracked the northern
provinces. The well-off, educated Afrikaners who formed these groupings were in
a very different position to those in the north. The bitter words of a contemporary
verkrampte survey of the formation of the A.B. echo the recurring conflict between
the wealthier south and north in nationalist politics: 'compared with the acute
distress raging In the Northern Province, there was little need south of the Hex
River1. (13)
This important point highlights what were in effect the different class
bases of the Nationalist movement in the Cape on one hand, and the Transvaal and
Free State on the other - the effects of which persist in the Nationalist Party
today. These variations relate in the main to: the differential nature of the
'rural community1 which formed the backbone of Nationalist support - the nature
of farming operations, the relationship with the colonial state in the emergence
of commercial agriculture, the size and location of markets etc; to the position
of the petty bourgeoisie vis-a-vis capital in general and the colonial state in
particular^ and to the relationship between the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie
and these differentiated rural groups. Compounded by differing colonial experiences
and the widely divergent economic and political effects of the Anglo-Boer war on
the Afrikaans-speaking populations of the north and south, these differences pro-
duced an economically, politically and culturally severed 'Afrikanerdom' at union
in 1910. The federation of the various provincial parties in the uneasy alliance
of the South African Party fostered an illusion of unity shattered in 1913 on the
issue of the relationship with Imperialism. The Afrikaner Broederbond was born
into and self-consciously as a result of these divisions. It was always an urban,
petty bourgeois, nor them-dominated grouping, reflecting in itself too the
differential relationship with fractions of capital between the northern and
southern petty bourgeoisie. Given the key interpretative role of this class in
all the provinces, some of these differences must be briefly examined in an
attempt to explain why the petty bourgeois response should have been specifically
Afrikaner Nationalist and why there were important variations in content and
orientation between the provincial movements.
The answers to these questions lie in the nature of the economic and
political incorporation of the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie in the broad
South African social formation. Within the imperialist colonial states a clear
cultural oppression operated against Afrikaans speakers* Long before the war
ended the independence of the Republics, so generating of fierce cultural response,
the language movement of the Cape had inspired a strong cultural nationalism.
More importantly, in an essentially peripheral economy dominated by the ideology
of imperialist interest, for those Afrikaners unprepared to accept cultural
assimilation and who possessed a modicum of training rendering them unsuitable for
manual labour, employment opportunities were limited. Law, the Church, education
and the lower levels of the state bureaucracy were the only real avenues available. (14)
English was the language of the economy. Even within these occupations, oppor-
tunities for advancement were limited and Afrikaans speakers discriminated against.
Thus for the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, economic opportunities were limited both
by class position and language. Yet these occupations placed the petty bourgeois
individual in a unique position from which to experience and at the same time to
mediate the effects of Imperialism for virtually all Afrikaans speakers. He
interpreted its law for farmers and workers,taught its curriculum to their children,
implemented its ,policies and, as a cleric, was particularly responsible for the
interpretation of the entire experience - its explanation in cosmic and symbolic
terms - to a confused volk. Thus In a sense, the experience of Imperialism was
synthesised in the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. Neither did the structure of
South African capitalism in its imperialist phase provide the culturally aware
Afrikaner fraction of the petty bourgeoisie with any real potential allies within
the dominant classes, except perhaps in the Cape. Such alliances would involve
total cultural assimilation and,more important, an acceptance of the long-term
dominance of the interests of imperialist mining and finance capital* Many
Afrikaners did make such alliances. Given the nature of the emergence of commercial
agriculture after the Anglo-Boer war, specific fractions of agricultural capital,
particularly in the Eastern and Western Transvaal, increasingly identified their
interests with Imperialism after the 1913 Land Act, Botha and Smuts personified
this alliance. But the petty bourgeoisie did not have this independent basis on
which to act. By nature a dependent class, alliances had to be sought elsewhere.
In the Cape, conditions were less traumatic, and the potential alliance
clear. The long established and prosperous commercial agriculture of the Western
Cape and Boland provided a viable basis for political and economic alliance - and
the possibilities of independent accumulation. Indeed the formation of the Cape
Nationalist Party, Die Nasionale Pers. and Santara and Sanlam had been seen very
clearly in these terms. In June 1915 in De Aar a 'Nationalist Party* was estab-
lished by Gen. Hertzog's leading Cape Parliamentary supporter, the English-
speaking Professor H.E.S. Fremantle* The Fremantle Party was based amongst the
poorer farmers of the Northern Cape, and enjoyed Hertzog's blessing, 'a develop-
ment which Advocate Hennle Van Zyl, W.A. Hofmeyer and their friends were not
prepared to tolerate1. (15) Mobilising support from Western Cape and Boland farmers,
a group of Cape Town and Stellenbosch professional men formed their own Nationalist
Party in the same month, and after Hofmeyer had refused the proferred leadership,
invited Dr Mai an to leave his pulpit, lead the Party and edit Its recently
established mouthpiece, Die Burger. In September the alliance of Cape Town petty
bourgeoisie and wealthy farmers took over the Fremantle Party, made the Professor
their Vice-Chairman, and assigned him to political oblivion. In terms of their
vision, the Cape Party, Die Nasionale Pers and Santam and Sanlam were to be financed
by the rural bourgeoisie, run by the urban petty bourgeoisie, and grow through
the mobilisation of the full spectrum of rural support. This strategy ultimately
provided an independent basis of accumulation producing a financial capital in the
South which dominates the Afrikaner Nationalism of the Cape.
In the north, and the Transvaal particularly, no such potentially viable
economic alliances were available. The petty bourgeoisie was politically more
isolated and required to interpret an economically much more hostile world for the
great bulk of Afrikaans speakers who had never known the prosperity of the Cape.
The political struggle of the northern petty bourgeoisie was thus built on an
alliance not with a strong fraction of capital as in the Cape, but with poorer
farmers and (potentially - It took a long time to develop), a class fraction which
grew out of this group, Afrikaner workers. This'could only be anti-Imperialist in
tone. Yet the pre-1934 Ideological content of Afrikaner Nationalism in the north
was dominated by rural interests - the problems of 'poor white ism1 seen in rural
terms, requiring a return to the land. It is precisely this ideologically isolated
position, reflecting the total economic dependence of the northern petty bourgeoisie
which made the Broederbond so vital. From the outset it expressed its concern
with urban issues. It saw the problems of poor whiteism and the position of
Afrikaners generally as an urban rather than rural phenomenon. Its solutions were
never to be sought simply at the level of politics, but In the ownership structure
of the Industrial economy, by challenging the nature of South African capitalism
itself. This orientation gave it the vanguard role after 1927, and even in the
days of the Hertzog Party, differentiated it from the broader concerns of the
Nationalist establishment.
Thus the politics of the 'Afrikanerdom' into which the infant A.B. was
born in 1918 reflected the class cleavages between Afrikans speakers. In this
bitter climate fourteen railwaymen, theologians and policemen formed 'an organisa-
tion in which Afrikaners could find each other in the midst of great confusion
and disunity and be able to work together for the survival of the Afrikaner people
in South Africa'and the promotion of its interests'. (16) According to its then
secretary, in its early years 'it was little more than a semi-religious organisation1,
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with little purpose or direction. (17) In December 1919 a loyalty oath was intro-
duced and the following year a constitution finally adopted. (18) Real expansion
began in 1921. In May of that year, It took up the question of Afrikaans schools, (19)
an interest which attracted 'a large number of teachers1. They fused a new life into
the Bond, one source claiming for it a membership of 2,000 in 1924. (2) The Oelofse
Report dates its expansion from August 1921 with the formation of a new branch in
Krugersdorp. On the 26th of that month a majority of the meeting held in the Carlton
Hotel decided the Bond would become a secret organisation. Henceforth it began to
concern itself with policy issues, dealing with matters such as 'the native question,
immigration, profiteering, home language education and library affairs'. (21) However
dissension crept in over the Nationalist/Labour Party Pact. The Bond's effectiveness
was undermined by an acrimonious split 1923-5, and there are suggestions of a 'purge',
though this may refer to 1927. After reconciliation in 1925 another period of
'consolidation and expansion' commenced, culminating in the critical 1927 decision 'to
take an active part in the life of the community, leaving no avenue neglected*. (22)
From this moment the A.B, began to assume for itself a vanguard role within Afrikaner
Nationalism and extend Its parameters beyond the loose federation of Provincial
Nationalist Parties.
II
Designed to ensure secrecy and control, the organisational structure of
the A.B. has changed little since the 1920s. The basic organisational unit is the
Division of between five and fifty members, meeting monthly* The organisation's
highest authority is the Bondsraad, a congress of divisional delegates convened at
the beginning of each July, j A twelve-member Ultvoerende Rasd (UR - executive
Council) christened 'the twelve apostles', presided over daily affairs. Membership
is restricted to financially sound, white, Afrikaans-speaking, Protestant males,
over/age age 25, of 'unimpeachable character1, who actively accept South Africa as
their sole homeland, containing a separate Afrikaner nation with its own language and
culture. To this long list of restrictions is added a complicated and careful
selection process* Membership Is by invitation only - nobody can apply to Join the
Bond. Names of prospective members, who must be known to at least half the members
of the Division, are circulated among the divisions and the UR. A system of blackballing
'maintains quality1. It Is this very tight selection process - the old-boy network
to end them all - which produces charges of elitism, and according to one former
member, 'enormous resentment amongst ordinary Afrikaners1. Approved candidates
become members of the division nearest their homes. Exceptions are the 'los' or
'vrygestelde broers' (exempted brothers), who, 'because of circumstances outalde
his control', cannot devote the requisite time to divisional meetings. In practice,
Los broers are members in high public office whose contribution is in terms of direct
influence rather than activity. (23)
In the thirties and forties, the Afrikaans urban population was overwhelmingly
working class. Divisional membership is constitutionally required to reflect the
occupational spectrum of the local Afrikaner community, giving the Bond the 'right1
to speak in its name. In practice, membership was and is confined largely to the
professions* A stiff annual fee (£12.10.0) and system of regular financial levies,
together with the strict requirement that prospective members be financially sound,
ruled out working class membership in any but token numbers* Workers were never
involved in the organisation. It was felt 'there was no specific need for workers
In the Broederbond*. (24) Analysis of membership throughout its 57-year history
highlights both its petty bourgeois nature and the subtle shifts in dominance by
various groups. Teachers, academics, clergymen and civil servants have always
provided the backbone of the Bond - over 50 per cent of its 2,528 members in 1944.
and still 35 per cent of 9.413 members in 1972. Other perennially large occupational
groupings are farmers, politicians, lawyers, journalists and assorted 'businessmen1.
In the thirties, the early influence of teachers was overshadowed by the ideological
dominance of academics, particularly those of Potchefstroom University. Reflecting
the A.B.'s concern with economic issues, the forties saw a strong influx of business-
men. Their proportional membership rose from virtually nil in the thirties to 15
per cent by 1972, with a disproportionate influence within the Bond. Prom the forties
to rougibly tt\e mid-sixties, no one group equalled the ideological dominance of the
academics during the thirties. (25)
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Built on 'a Christian-national foundation* with its motto 'Be strong1,
the Bond's constitutional aims are three-foldi 'to effect an healthy and pro-
gressive unity between all Afrikaners who strive for the welfare of the Afrikaner
nation; the stimulation of Afrikaner national consciousness and the inculcation
of love for its language, religion, tradition, country and peoplej and the promotion
of all the interests of the Afrikaner nation*. Clause 6 of the constitution excludes
party politics from the organisation, containing a seven-fold guide to individual
political action. This includes: full constitutional sovereignty; combatting
ail inferior treatment of Afrikaners and Afrikaans in the civil service; ending the
foreign exploitation of South Africa's population and resources through nationally
controlled intensive industrialisation; segregation of all'non-whites' under
white 'guardianship'; rehabilitation of the rural areas and full 'civilised* white
employment; 'nationalisation' of finance and the planned coordination of the
economy; and the Christian-national 'Afrikanerisation* of public life and education
with 'freedom' for self-development for all groups, 'provided it does not constitute
a danger to the state1. (26) These aims clearly cover a broad spectrum of interest,
A critical question is what exactly constitutes 'the Afrikaner nation' and Its
'interests'? Who are the 'ons' (us) of Nationalist rhetoric? What was it about
'ons' which enabled the interests of farmers, workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie
and capitalists to be depicted as those of 'the Afrikaner nation1, and how have
these interests changed? After 1927 the Broederbond entrusted itself with the largely
successful identification, interpretation, guardianship and promotion of these
interests. Its analysis and solutions to the problems of 'Afrikanerdom' were those
of an economically deprived and excluded petty bourgeoisie. The structure of
South African capitalism was identified as the source of this discrimination and
the Bond set out 'to capture the foreign [capitalist] system and transform and adapt
it to our national character*. (27) The Afrikaner nationalism it espoused was
similarly a petty bourgeoise response which could coordinate the interests of various
Afrikaans-speaking class forces against the 'Imperialist' hegemonic and dominant
classes*
Beyond these broad aims, how does the Broederbond function? It must be
clearly understood that for most of its life, the A.B. was a policy-making body.
It determined the fields of action and their parameters for the volk, without itself
directly implementing policy. Its own description of the policy formation process
is illuminating. Monthly divisional meetings consider 'everything to do with
Afrikaners in its particular area, especially economic life'. Policy proposals are
first discussed within a division, presumed to be representative of the local community.
Individual members 'exercise their professional expertise' on the problem. Proposals
are then referred to other divisions and examined 'with due regard for local conditions
and ^ requirements'. If widely supported, a 'more searching enquiry is instituted*
by U.R. - appointed 'experts'. When the 'fully worked-out1 scheme is accepted by
the Bondsraad, 'it follows it must have been fully discussed*. If its realisation
'is not dependent on state action1, the scheme 'is laid before the people1 for
ratification, not by the Bond (it has no public existence), 'but by those people who
have the greatest interest in it'. In practice, this meant convening a Volkskongres
(people's national congress) by one of the A.B.'s front organisations. These
occurred regularly during the thirties and forties when it was mobilising support
for its policies. Finally, 'if state action is essential for the implementation of
the scheme, the matter is submitted to the government body concerned for consideration
and the necessary steps, or to the nation for consideration in public. Should the
project meet with approval, it is then taken further by the proper authorities'. (28)
Since ail South Africa's prime ministers after 1948 and, most of their cabinets have
belonged to the Bond, it generally has little problem in gaining the ear of 'the proper
authorities'. Recalling his 20-year membership, one now antagonistic former divisional
chairman insisted the process was 'extremely democratic'. Complaints were 'thoroughly
and frankly aired' and through this 'democratic procedure' the Bond generated 'a
very powerful sense of fellowship, solidarity and commitment - if one can use the
phrase of the Broederbond, a feeling of intense comradeship'. As the old-boy net-
work par excellence, it established 'ongoing machinery to handle everything'. When
entering a new field, e.g. trade unionism in 1936, 'it always establishes a public
front1. (29) Since 1929, its major policy implementing body has been the Federasig
van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereni^ings (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations -
F.A.K.) described by military Intelligence as the A.B.'s 'pasteboard stalking horse*.
(30)
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A picture emerges of an immense formal and informal network of influence
at all social levels. For much of its existence the A.B. dominated the institutional,
ideological and financial life of Afrikaner nationalism. Its influence ranges
through cultural organisation, the Afrikaans churches, the Nationalist Party, professional
groupings, the spectrum of Afrikaans business undertakings to all levels of state
power itself - from the State President through the state bureaucracy, civil and
military. A military intelligence chart of its influence during the war suggested
that beyond its formal and informal connections, a system of Waaksaamheid (vigilance)
committees functioned to keep an eye on and foster 'Afrikaner interests1 in all
fields. This was repeatedly denied. However, in 1973 the Sunday Times published
detailed lists of the members of these committees, staffed by the Bond's intellectual
elite and deputed 'to keep a close watch on every public body and every Important
sector of public life ... notice any backsliding, lack of enthusiasm or deviation
from policy'. (31) It is an overstatement to suggest however that the Bond 'runs'
South Africa - is its secret government. This devalues the role of the Party itself
which is no simple A.B. front in politics and has often been in conflict with it.
But certainly Its influence has been profound, its 'advice' always listened to, and
when unanimous, regularly followed*
Its decisive interventions at all policy levels apart, the Bond has
furthered its members' interests In other ways. While its various public utterances
and apologists depict a dedicated, selfless band of public-spirited men working
unrewarded in the service of their volk, much evidence suggests the material com-
pensations of membership go beyond mere influence. The Botha Commission reproduces
an A.B. document labled Helpmekaar (help each other) listing numterous occupational
vacancies in ten towns, naming the Broers to be contacted. Curiously, it then
dismissed the claim that the A.B. fosters 'Jobs for pals'* Military Intelligence
reports and the long-running Sunday Times campaign against the Bond cite similar
documents. Hoodie quotes 'a former chairman' of the A.B. saying it has now
degenerated into 'Jobs for pals'. (32) At the least, this old-boy network has
protected its members' interests very effectively. It is widely accepted amongst
Afrikaners that membership is extremely useful careerwise, and almost as widely
resented by nationalist non-members. (33) Be this as it may, through its network
of influence, for much of the period under review, the Bond controlled two key areas
of Afrikaner nationalism - ideology and finance:
'The A.B.'s tremendous influence must be attributed to the fact that
its policy is based on two fundamental principles, namely to gain control
of the minds of Afrikanerdom through control of its educational institutions
and to control its actions by gaining a tight grip on its purse strings.'
(34)
For much of the twenties the A.B. functioned in semi-Masonic fashion,
almost exclusively in cultural fields. Two traumatic events in the twenties and
thirties decisively altered its role and led to the adoption of a vanguard position.
The first was the 1926 Baifour Declaration on the sovereignty of the Dominions.
Returning from the Imperial confernece, the nationalist Prime Minister, General
Hertzog, announced the constitutional alms of his Party were now largely satisfied
and It would abandon its republican demands. The many horrified republicans grouped
themselves round men like Dr N.J* van der Merwe who established a formal republican
ginger group (Republikeinsebond) within the party in 1930, after consultations with
the Potchefstroom academics who then dominated the A«B. (35) Certainly It would
appear the formation of an A.B. clique within the Transvaal party was inspired by
Hertzog's declaration and the decision that he was no longer to be fully trusted.
Hereafter, the A.B. became in a sense an alternative to the Party itself, attracting
men like those of Potchefstroom. Though this could only be proved with access
to A.B. archives, X would argue Hertzog's accouncement prompted the 1927 decision to
'expand activities and take an active part in the life of the community, leaving no
avenue neglected'. (36) Its self-conscious assumption of the vanguard mantle of
Akrikaner Nationalism certainly dates from this period.
The prime achievement of the Bond in the late twenties was its establish-
ment of a cultural front in December 1929 - the Federasle van Afrikaanse Kultuur-
vereniglngs {F.A.K.). Established to 'combat cultural chaos', the F.A.K. was
the Bond's answer to the 'need for central coordination' of cultural action,
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through which it controlled and politicized the cultural debates of the thirties.
"It [the formation of the FAX] had only one great
meaning. Afrikaners should grasp each other by the
hand; the F.A.K. should bring the hands together;
and those hands should never let each other go."
The Bond always insisted it merely "inspired" the FAK!s formation whereafter the
organization developed its own dynamic. The FAX did embark on a wide range of
activities. By 1937 almost 300 cultural bodies, church councils, youth and student
associations, charitable, scientific and educational groups had affiliated to it.
Yet it was without doubt the AB's front - paternity was often acknowledged. With few
token exceptions both shared the same executive councils and officials, who publicly
implemented privately determined policy. In effect, the ABfs routine cultural work
was now openly undertaken by the FAK, freeing the Bond to concentrate on policy.
"We find the A.B, is slowly handing over the cultural
work itself to our much bigger son, the F.A.K. ...
[but] national culture and the welfare of the nation
will only flourish if the South African people break
all foreign political bonds. After the cultural and
economic needs, the A.B. will have to devote its
attention to the political needs of our people." (38)
Of the disenchanted petty bourgeois Republicans the Bond attracted in the late
twenties, most important were the Gereformeerde academics of Potchefstroom. They
brought to it a developed, rigorously conservative, Calvinist We 1 tanschauung - the
skeletal framework for an ideological redefinition of Afrikaner Nationalism they
heavily influenced in the thirties. These academics gave the AB a new vigour and self-
consciously operated as its idealogues. In the confused days of Coalition and Fusion,
their influence kept much of the Afrikaner intelligentsia out of the United Party and
provided some ideological credibility to the very weak Gesuiwerde (purified) Nationalist
Party in the Northern Provinces. (39) Between the formation of the FAK and Coalition
in 1933* they set out to strengthen the Bond organizationally as well. The
Republikeinsebond was one result, though other schemes, such as an approach to the
"Royal Order of Scotland" appear rather ludicrous. And the Bond moved slowly out of
its Transvaal exclusivism. In 1931 the first OFS branch was established in
Bloemfonteia, followed shortly by another in Cape Town. (40)
Whatever the Republicans' mistrust of Hertzog, given his immense political
stature, they were unable to move out of the Nationalist Party into an open challenge
until he himself precipitated the break. The Coalition crisis of 1933 and split in
the Nationalist Party with Fusion in 1934 were the second of the catalysts which
finally gave the AB ideological predominance in the North. Of the 74 Nationalist MPs
elected in 1933, only 19 joined the Cape leader, Dr D. F. Malan, In refusing to follow
Hertzog into fusion with Smuts1 South African Party to form the Unitgd Party (UP).
Of these, 15 were Cape representatives. Only one of the Transvaal1 s^Nationalist MPs
and four of 15 in the OFS remained aloof. The result was to shift the weight of
Nationalist ideological and political leadership in the North towards extra-Parliamentary
sources. An extra-Parliamentary tradition developed to contribute to the vicious split
between the Parliamentary Nationalist Party and the various extra-Parliamentary groups
(particularly the Ossewa Brandwag) during the war. The Pptchefstroom academics thus
exercised an inordinate leadership, soon complemented by the slightly different emphases
of returning students such as Dre Diedrichs, Meyer and Verwoerd.
Fusion marked two related developments in Afrikaner Nationalism. Firstly, it
changed its class basis - more particularly, the relationship between rural and petty
bourgeois elements in the North. Under Hertzog, rural interests dominated the concerns
of Afrikaner Nationalism. The petty bourgeoisie were relegated to a supportive
position. Given the nature of its economic concerns, heavily dependent on the state and
discriminated against by "Imperialism", the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie was left
isolated in the North. Almost without exception, Northern commercial agriculture
supported the UP. Rural support for the Gesuiwerdes, such as it was, came from poorer
farmers or professional groups in the platteland towns. In its isolation, the petty
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bourgeoisie was reduced to articulating the interests of "the small man". This gave
the Northern Gesuiwerde party, and the Afrikaner Nationalism which developed a very
different class character to its Hertzogite predecessor, an almost exclusively petty
bourgeois grouping. (41)
In the Cape, however, the petty bourgeoisie was still in political and
economic alliance with commercial agriculture, and operating in a different political
tradition. Fifteen Cape r^ Ps remained in the Gesuiwerde party, and more importantly,
thanks largely to the efforts of W. A. Hofmeyr and F. C. Erasmus, most of the Branch
organizations as well. Cape Nationalists thus enjoyed strong Parliamentary
representation. Their leader, Dr Malan, was now National leader of the Gesuiwerdes,
the only really prominent member of the Hertzog party to stay out of Fusion. His
stature was thus even greater. The Cape Gesuiwerde party was in effect almost
identical to its Hertzogite predecessor, personally, ideologically, and organizationally.
Unlike the North, neither a strong extra-Parliamentary tradition developed nor had the
class basis of organized Cape Afrikaner Nationalism changed much with fusion. This
had important long-term effects. The prestige of Dr Malan and the numerical
predominance of Cape MPs gave the Cape Party and the interests it represented a
national preponderance much resented in the North. Secondly, though Malan himself
undoubtedly changed his position on many important issues (e.g. Republicanism) and
made concessions to the developing Northern rhetoric, the AB-directed ideological
redefinition did not go nearly so far in the Cape - it did not need to. Operating in
a different class and ideological nexus, the relatively few Cape AB activists were
less wrapped in the ideological mysticism of the North.
A second related result of fusion was the emergence of a new generation of
ideological and political leaders, again predominantly in the North. These younger
men had not fought in the Anglo-Boer war and had lived most1 of their lives in a
unified South Africa. Given a chance at leadership and an influence they would
otherwise have had to wait long for, they brought to Afrikaner Nationalism new vigour,
ideas and perspectives. To the influence of the young Potchefstroom academics was
soon added that of men like the famous four doctors, N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer,
H. F. Verwoerd, and A. Hertzog - all newly returned from overseas study, and,Diedrichs
and Meyer in particular, heavily influenced by European Fascism. With the Potchefstroom
academics they led the post-fusion ideological redefinition of Afrikaner Nationalism.
Soon after Coalition, a new journal, Koers (Directions), appeared from
Potchefstroom. Its first editorial expounds its self-conscious ideological role:
"Indeed, in our country and throughout the entire world,
there exists the greatest confusion on religious, moral,
educational, social, political and economic issues.
However weak and impotent it may be in many respects,
with the help and mercy of God, Koers will try to give
direction in all these areas." (42]
During the thirties, Koers was effectively the theoretical journal of a major faction
of the Bond. It raised all the contemporary issues, answering them in policy terms.
The analysis of coalition in its first issue shows clearly the environment it sought
to interpret, and the economic motivation underlying AB nationalism:
"General Hertzog has achieved what neither Gen. Botha
nor Gen. Smuts could do. He has reconciled the great
majority of Afrikaners with the idea of the British
Empire..,. When, with Sovereignty [reference to the
1926 Balfour Declaration and 1931 Statute of Westminster],
Gen. Hertzog also accepted cooperative imperialism, in
in practice the differences between the two large parties
on this issue fell away.... It is therefore certain that
under the new regime less emphasis will be placed on
sovereignty than on mutual cooperation within the Empire.
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"Once again Imperialism will stride triumphant through
the land. Under present international conditions,
cooperative Imperialism will mainly, though not
exclusively, take the form of economic collaboration.
Our monetary system, our commercial and banking
policy, our industrial sector will remain Imperialist
oriented and grow increasingly so. In the place of
the old political subjugation we now enter a period of
economic dependence. And the golden chains so forged
are much stronger and more dangerous than the old
[political]- chains because they are more difficult to
recognise, and once forged, are not easily discarded.
The apparatus of this collaboration is already largely
extant, particularly in the banking and commercial
sectors. Only a government fully committed to South
Africa's economic independence could escape this
octopus grip. What will happen under a government
sympathetic [to imperialism] is impossible to predict." (43)
In this environment of perceived economic domination, the AB strove to interpret the
world and formulate counter-policy for its petty bourgeois membership. It recognized
political power was the key to an inversion of this process. Yet the petty bourgeoisie
was isolated. Allies had to be found. These consisted potentially of two major groups •
the poorer farmers, the many pressures on whom gave rise to, secondly, Afrikaans-
speaking workers. But their support could not simply be appropriated. Poorer farmers
tended to follow the lead of wealthier land-owners, and Afrikaner workers displayed an
unhealthy attraction for class organizations. Given the existence of a large group of
poor whites, a real danger existed that they could be mobilized in class terms, thereby
undermining any potential mass base for Afrikaner Nationalism. An obsession with the
dangers of class division and class mobilization is a major theme of Nationalist
ideologues of this period. These groups had to be saved for the volk and mobilized in
cultural terms. Yet, underlying all these problems was the almost complete exclusion
of Afrikaans-speakers from control in any sector of the economy bar farming. By
1939/9 Afrikaner-controlled enterprises contributed just 8$ to total turnover in
commerce, Jfc of industrial output, 1% of mini Tig, and 3% of finance. (44) If the basis
of imperialist domination was economic, as Koers argued, the mere capture of state
power would not end it. That was the discredited Hertzog panacea. Rather, Afrikaners
would have to move into positions of economic control. The petty bourgeoisie would
have to transform itself into a bourgeoisie on the savings of Afrikaner workers and
farmers - the proven Cape formula. This, too, was the message of Koers. Thus,
throughout the thirties, the AB directed its attention to these inter-related problems,
operating in three broad areas: the ideological redefinition of Afrikanerdom and its
Nationalism - kultuurpolitiek; the organization of Afrikaner workers into separate
trade unions; and the establishment and promotion of Afrikaner business interests.
The pre- and post-fusion ideological definitions differed at two levels -
the delimitation of "Afrikanerdom" and the Nationalism which resulted. The Hertzog
conceptions which thoroughly dominated the Nationalist Party were obliquely concerned
with class. All white South Africans, English- and Afrikaans-speaking, who subscribed
to the Hertzog definitions were the constituents of "Afrikanerdom". Its three great
ideals were: sovereign independence; absolute equality of language rights between
English and Afrikaans; and limited economic nationalism - summed up in the "South
Africa First" motto. (45) The 1925 Language and Flag Acts, the 1932 Status Act, and
the achievements of the Pact government largely fulfilled these ideals, and, as Koers
recognized, Hertzog could rejoin with Smuts. The "Afrikanerdom" the Hertzog Party
sought to mobilize was never seen purely in terms of a rigidly culturally defined volk.
So far as the Party concentrated on "cultural" issues, it was in the context of language
rights. It implicitly accepted the class divisions within "white" South Africa as the
basis of political action, generally content to leave Afrikaans-speaking workers to the
Labour Party, and made little attempt to attack their mobilization and organization in
class terms. (46)
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This ideological "looseness" and acceptance of "foreign"notions of class
division were held responsible for Hertzog's "sell-out" to imperialism. If not to be
repeated, the concepts Afrikanerdom, Afrikaner Nationalism, the question of class in
politics and the nature of politics itself required extensive redefinition. English-
speakers could be excluded as "foreign elements", involving a definition of what was
peculiarly "Afrikaans" about Afrikaners - an intensive analysis of kultuur in its
widest sense, interpreted in terms of the "Afrikaner" past. The parameters of
culture established, they had then to be translated into specifically political
ide91ogy - given a content which could appeal to the interest of all "Afrikaners",
Thus the thirties saw an intense and wide-ranging debate amongst the AB intellectuals
on kultuur, volk, politics, economics, history, religion, etc., as they sought to
reinterpret the experience of imperialism and translate it into ideological forms.
Within this debate, at least three major streams of influence, each with
many permutations, can be identified. Through Koers and the individual writings of
men such as Professors J. C. Van Rooy (AB Chairman^ L. J, du Plessis, H. G. Stoker
and C. Coetzee, the Potchefstroom academics elaborated a rigidly Calvinist
Westanschauung, drawing heavily on the doctrine of "sowereiniteit in eie kring"
(sovereignty in each sphere) of the Dutch theologian/politician Abraham Kuyper,
Through Koers they kept up a running commentary on every aspect of social life.
Heavily influenced by National Socialism, other newly returned academics outside
Potchefstroom developed a more secular Nationalism, Elaborated amongst others by men
such as Drs N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer and G, Cronje, it received its most explicit
statement in Diedrichs1 Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing. published in 1936. This
group, too, found a regular organ in Wapenskou, journal of the Afrikaans-Nasiomie
Studentebond(Afrikaans National Students' Union). A modified form of the "neo-
Fichtean" view was propagated by Dr Verwoerd as editor of Die Transvaler after 1937 -
and led to a lasting split with the first chairman of his board, W. A. Eofmeyr. A
third, less co-ordinated source of influence was another group of Calvinist
theologian/politicians, those of the NGK. Altogether more pragmatic in tone and the
application of dogma, they exerted a profound political influence, predominantly
through the Nasionale Fers newspapers and the Gesuiwerde party itself. This "liberal-
nationalist" influence emanated from men such as Dr Malan himself, Lr J, D. ("Vader")
Kestell, and Rev. W. Nicol. (47)
Despite the many differences within and between these groups, sufficient
common ground existed to enable the ideological debate to take place within agreed
parameters. Pour broad areas of agreement emerged: the relationship between culture
and nationalism! the dangers of class divisions; the need for the economic
mobilization of Afrikaners; and Republicanism. All groups agreed nations are products
of Divine Will, each with an allotted task, distinguished from each other by culture
in its broadest sense. Culture is thus to be developed for itself. Hence the Bond's
assertion:
"The Afrikaner Broederbond is born out of the deep
conviction that the Afrikaner nation has been
planted in this country by the Hand of God,
destined to survive as a separate nation with its
own calling." (48)
During the thirties, this divinely created Afrikaner nation was politically divided,
culturally disunited and wracked by severe class divisions. Afrikaner workers had
little contact with the volk. displayed scant interest in its culture, and behaved
economically and politically in class terms. The huge "poor white problem" was the
most glaring manifestation of this division. Rapid "denationalization" of urban
Afrikaners, particularly poor whites, disturbed all ideologues. They agreed on the
major theme of the period, the overriding need for unity (volkseenheid) and more
particularly the need to win workers to Afrilcaner Nationalism. In the words of
Dr Diedrichs:
"If the worker is drawn away from out nation, we may
as well write Ichabod on the door of our temple." (49)
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Hankering after the "unity" of the Great Trek and the Republics, in terms of whose
mythology all were farmers and united against external enemies, class divisions were
seen as the product of "foreign" capitalism. While Afrikaners had suffered under
capitalism, the solution lay in improving their position in the industrial economy,
to take control of South African capitalism itself and develop a volkskapi tali sine.
"And meanwhile the adjustment process [to foreign
capitalism] was destroying our volk by alienating
from it its economic leaders through denationalisation
and rendering its producing masses useless to it
through proletarianisation. But in the awakening of
self-consciousness the volk has realised this too and
the new economic national movement sets itself the
goal of reversing this process: to prevent the further
destruction of the Afrikaner volk in an attempt to
adjust to a foreign capitalist system; but to mobilise
the volk to capture this foreign system and transform
and adapt it to our national charaoter." (50)
And, finally, this transformation of kultuur. classes and the economy was to be
encapsulated in a Republic, freed from British political domination, "independent" of
the golden chains Koers so regularly warned of. On this, too, there was unanimity -
though Malan!s conversion was belated, and,some would argue, hesitant. The Bond's
vision of Republican nirvana received its apotheosis in the controversial Draft
Republican Constitution published "for discussion" in 1942- (51)
This common ideological ground incorporated a consensus on the role of the
individual in national endeavour, and the relationship between political power and the
economic struggle. Entrepreneurshlp was seen as the highest form of creative activity,
provided the entrepreneur gave "service" in return for the just reward of profit,
Calvinism in this sense representing the purest form of the Protestant Ethic, capitalist
ideology in its pre-monopoly form. This interplay between wins and diena (profit and
service - to the community) both in politics and economics, was the major concern of
the early issues of the two "economic^ journals, Inspan (official PAK organ - hence
AB) and Volkshandel (organ of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut - Chambers of Commerce -
another AB offspring). Despite their initial and symbolic anti-capitalist rhetoric,
both clearly represent an attempt to create a capitalist ideology in keeping with
Calvinist prescriptions. Here, too, the ideological vanguard role of the Bond is
evident. Through these journals it took upon itself no less a task than "the
economic re-education" of Afrikaans-speakers - the reformulation of attitudes to
economic participation in an urban industrial economy. Inspan was directed towards
the broad masses, reflecting the mobilizational role of the Redd 1 ngsdaadbond (literally
Union for the Act of Rescue), whilst Volkshandel grappled with the problems of the
entrepreneur himself, (52) Their early issues contain two major themes. Firstly,
the relationship between individual effort and reward is constantly explored, invoking
a schema with a correct place in the hierarchy for all, and echoing many of the themes
of European and American puritanism. Vorkers must work in return for a fair wage.
The common good lies in common effort allowing those with ability to rise to their
natural level. Secondly, the function of the state is examined at length. Though
some differences between ideological streams are evident here, all agree the state
exists to provide a "just" framework for the mediation of individual effort. This
has many aspects. The state should provide the infrastructure for development in
South Africa, ensure the services needed by entrepreneurs. Its South African nature
is critical. The state is the prime agent of economic struggle against imperialism,
guaranteeing not only the profits and labour needs of the entrepreneur but employment
for all members of the polity (i.e. excluding Blacks). In this vision the state is
very claarly the instrument of petty bourgeois attack on monopoly control of the
economy by "imperialist" interests and the means for the transformation of its class
position. Political power then becomes the sine qua non of the success of the economic
struggle. The two are indivisible as the transformation of economic consciousness
aimed at by the Bond is, in effect, a transformation of political consciousness - a
redefinition of nationalism itself.
cont. SSA/75/10
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The debates within the AB during the thirties were essentially elitist -
small groups of intellectuals talking to each other in complex language. The volk
itself displayed little interest. Yet this elitism is central to the process of
ideological production. Ideologies are forged "by class forces seeking wider support,(55)
The fiercely intellectual debates 1932-8 thus achieved two major objectives. In an
era of extreme ideological division, they indicated the common ground outlined above,
facilitating aotion on these issues. Secondly, with reference to mass action, the
Kultuurpolltiek of the thirties erected an apparently tight yet sufficient flexible
ideological structure through which to legitimize mass action. It succeeded in the
redefinition of the value structure of a broad cultural system. This not only placed
the supporters of the Hertzog definition on the defensive (54) but provided an
ideological framework for the interpretation and mediation of the urban experience
of capitalism. Only after these issues had been aired was the Bond able to move
from its intellectual base into the arena of mass mobilization.
Yet, even before this was attempted, the Bond's Afrikaner opponents
recognized the danger this ideological redefinition posed to their position. In a
famous speech to his Smithfield constituents in November 1955» Prime Minister
Hertzog launched a powerful attack on the AB in precisely these terms. Accusing the
Bond of anti-English racialism, he asserted (incorrectly) that it and the Gesuiwerde
Nationalist Party were one and the same body operating at different levels. This
Bpeech caused much consternation, earning Hertzog the final implacable enmity of the
AB. (55)
Prior to 1956, whilst the FAK was working well, the Bond's cultural
activities were largely limited. It had not established the matrix of "alternative"
cultural organizations which appeared in the late thirties and forties. The means
of politicizing kultuur, making its appeal immediate to the great mass of Afrikaners,
had not been found. The first faltering mobilization attempts were begun in 1936
(see below), but it was the cultural orgy of the celebration of the Voortrekker
Centenary, the Eeufees and Tweede Trek,which politicized the cultural sumbole of
Afrikanerdom, enabling the AB to begin to work with mass support. The Tweede Trek
appeared to "bridge the severe class divisions between Afrikaans-speakers, eliciting
a massive demand for volkseenheid. (56) Another significant result of the Eeufees
was the birth of the Ossewa Brandwag. Initially a purely cultural organization, it
had attracted 3-400,000 members by 1941. The Potchefstroom academics flocked to the
0B, which thrived on the extra-Parliamentary tradition of the North. Its increasingly
political stance finally brought it into fatal conflict with the Nationalist Party.
Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd single-mindedly set out to destroy the organization
between 1941 and 1944 and re-establish the hegemony of the Party in nationalist
politics. The intense conflict between them occasioned much conflict within the
Broederbond after the failure of its reconciliation attempts. (57)
One final event was to publicize further kultuur and enable the AB to
transform its Nationalist vision into ideological hegemony. In September 1939 the
United Party split on South Africa's participation in what was seen as an
"imperialist war". General Hertaog and 37 of its MPs left the UP to form the
VoIks-party. The AB hastily convened another gathering at Monument Koppie. Amidst
great emotion, Hertzog and Malan appeared together as the spokesmen of an
apparently reunited volk. In January 1940, they formed the Herenigde (reunited)
Nationale of Volksparty (HNPA) under Hertzog. This uneasy alliance split almost
immediately on the Principles of the Party. When the Bond forced the issue at the
Free State Party Congress in November, Hertzog withdrew and resigned from politics.
His followers in the NHP/V soon split into the Afrikaner Party or the National
Socialist Nuwe Orde. But Hereniging meant the HNP/V could claim to be the sole
spokesman of a "re-united" Afrikanerdom. The petty bourgeoisie was no longer
politically isolated. The AB could make much of the issue of cultural unity and
mobilize across class divisions in these terms.
During the forties, the cultural assaults of the Bond covered every facet
of organized social life. Though political disunity soon resurfaced, kultuurpolitiek
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no longer divided Afrikaners along class or party political l ines. The A.B.
interpretations had been legitimised. Apart from the crucial issues of trade
unionism and the economic struggle, during the war it concentrated on education,
pressing for home language tuition coupled with an emphasis on i t s own (largely
Kuyperian) Christian National Education Program. Largely in response to these
attacks, Smuts banned civil servants from membership of the Bond in December 1944,
occasioning some 500 resignations. A former A.B. chairman claimed that with the
economic struggle, the Bond's attacks on the educational system were the major
spars to the HNP/v s 1948 electoral victory. (58)
Whilst Kultuurpolitiek provided an ideological framework within which to
forge volkseenheld, political power grows out of class interests and class action,
not cultural enthusiasm. Two crit ical A.B. movements during the forties gave
the general cultural movement a specific class content facilitating the
politicisation of class cleavages in cultural terms. These were the assault on
the Trade Unions and the economic movement. The first captured working class
support, the second made clear the economic basis and petty bourgeois content of
Afrikaner Nationalism. The Bond's f irst entry into trade unionism were the
formation in 1934 of a railway workers' union, Spoorbond, by Henning Klopper, an
A.B. founder. Spoorbond offered an example both of "non-confrontational11 trade
unionism and the mobilisation of the savings of i ts members. Three years after
inception i t established a savings bank. Though later bankrupted, Spoorbondkas
initiated the first Afrikaans building society, later to emerge as the now
massive Saambou
More important than Spoorbond were the post 1936 organisations. Following
the 1936 Bondersraad and F.A.K. congress, the Afrikaanse Nasionale Kultuurraad
(National Cultural Council) was formed to give direction to the full spectrum
of cultural organisations with the basic aim of organising Afrikaner workers.
This move met with some resistance in the Cape and amongst railway workers. But
in October of that year, Drs. A Hertzog (the General's son) N. Diedrichs, and
P.J. Meyer, together with the manager of the A.B.- founded Volkskas bank, F. de Wet,
formed Die Nasionale Raad van Trustees (National Council of Trustees - N.R.T.),
to provide financial backing for Afrikaner trade unions. I t s aim was quite
explicit - to smash the ideology of class amongst Afrikaner workers and bring them
into the bosom of the yolk. The NRT operated in fertile ground. Entrenched by
the gains of the Pact government, the Labour Party and South African Trades and
Labour Council (T fie LC) s t i l l exhibited the artisaual exclusivism of craft unions.
In the crisis of the thirt ies they strongly opposed measures to ease white
unemployment which might relax the apprenticeship system. Yet both leaned
heavily on the support of Afrikaans-speaking workers, who, given the pattern of
proletarianisation in South Africa, generally occupied less skilled positions.
The NRT decided to attack the Labour Party hold over Afrikaner workers through the
T C LC's largest single affil iate, the strategic Mine Workers Union. The only
non-craft mining union, with a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking membership in an
industry critical to the economy and the racial division of labour, by the mid-
thirt ies the Mine Workers' Union leadership was thoroughly corrupt and in a cosy
arrangement with the Chamber of Mines. In a long, bitter, twelve year campaign,
the NRT-group finally gained control - though i t s leadership soon appeared ho
less corrupt than the old. (59)
The trade union struggle was not without cost within the A.B., where as
early as 1942 discontent with the NRT's progress was being expressed. (60). In
1942, Meyer resigned to start a Labour Front for the Ossewa Brandwag. The
following year, the HNP/v formed i t s own labour organisation in response,
Die Blanke Werkerse Beskerminflsbond (l i teral ly, white workers protection society).
Competition between these groups occasioned much conflict within the A.B. The
broad attack on trade unionism concentrated on the least skilled workers in the
mining, textile, building and steel industries. The skillful manipulation of their
very real grievances, together with the extensive cultural mobilisation through
the Bond's Reddinqsdaadbqnd - i .e . changing the ideological context of trade
unionism - had the desired effect. Though by no means all Afrikaner workers
supported these organisations, sufficient were ideologically weaned from the
bureaucratic Labour Party and T flc LC structure to break their power. Following
two long strikes on the mines in 1946 and 1947 - against the Mine Workers' Union -
and a huge building workers strike - against state training schemes for African
bricklayers - the NRT group finally won control of the Mine Workers' Union, and
immediately disaffiliated from the T & LC. The political fruits of this victory
were soon plucked. In the 1948 election, the HNP/v won six mining constituencies
for the first time, sufficient to put i t in power with a majority of five.
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This struggle for the soul of white trade unionism occurred in a crucial
phase of South Africa's labour history, when.the relationship between the black
proletariat and the capitalist state emerged at the political centre. During the
war. a powerful, militant African trade union movement developed to effectively
question the entrenched capital/labour relationship. (6l) The wartime movement
of Africans into skilled positions too highlighted the relationship between white
workers and the state, particularly the less skilled. The A.B. attack on trade
unions was explicitly cast in terms of a recognition of the dangers of class
mobilisation in such a climate. Its primary aim was to break the power of
ideologies of class - to mobilise workers in terms of their class interests cast
in cultural and racial ideologies. In the words of the official NRT history:
"As the so-called guardian of the workers, over a period of time
the Labour Party developed into a might}force in South African
politics This Bond between the worker and the Labour Party
had to be broken, only then would the struggle to Dr. Hertzog
and his small band of activists acquire any meaning or significance.
This was their major message". (62).
The activities of the various trade union bodies both occasioned conflict
between the political organisations of Afrikaner Nationalism during the war and
again highlighted the divisions between the petty bourgeoisie of the North and
South. One incident neatly sums this up. Despite strenuous attempt by the Bond
and F.A.K. to raise money for the NRT, it became clear the large sums needed
could only be obtained from wealthy Cape farmers - it had initially been funded by
a £10,000 donation from the widow of the Stellenbosch farmer who first financed
Nasionale Pers and Santam, Mrs. Jannie Marais. Here the NRT entered reserved
territory, the preserve of the Cape petty bourgeoisie. Though resistant to the
Nasionale Kultuurraad, in principle the managers of the political and economic
organisations of Cape Nationalism had little quarrel with the NRT's aims. But
when it began to compete for the same sources of finance, open warfare ensued.
In 1938, Dr. Hertzog approached his maternal uncle, a wealthy Stellenbosch farmer
Pieter Neethling, to set up a trust fund for the NRT. Neethling was a founder and
director of Santam, and a long and vicious fight developed between its chairman,
W.A. Hofmeyer and the NRT, won inevitably by Santam who allowed the Raad only
specific interest for use. (63) This incident caused much ill feeling in the
North, which fostered as the full import of Southern economic power grew more
obvious in the economic movement of the Forties.
Of the A.B. activities, the economic movement had the greatest long term
significance. The Bond's concern with economic issues was long paramount. Again
Koers first gave coherence to many of its debates. In a seminal article ^ 'The
Economic Reorganisation of our National Life", Prof. L.J. du Plessia argued that
Afrikaners had suffered enormously under capitalism, ranging from the conquest of
the Republics to the poor white problem.". Yet the cause was not inherent in
capitalism itself. Their struggle should not be directed against capitalism, as
socialists argued, but the structure of. South African capitalism, more particularly,
control of finance and credit - capital itself. Afrikaners should be mobilised to
take control of South African capitalism - develop a system of Volkskapitalisme
(National/people's capitalism). (64)
Meyer and Diedrichs too wrote heavily on economic issues in the thirties.
In 1934, largely on the initiative of J.J. Bosman, the Broederbond itself
established a cooperative bank in Pretoria with Prof, du Plessis as chairman and
most of the U.R. as directors. In 1941, Volkskas was registered as a commercial
bank and lost its cooperative form. (65) In the same year the A.B. also
established a retail outlet, Uniewinkels. It, too, later lost its cooperative
form. Yet these Northern operations were limited in scale, unable to generate
wider economic activity.
In the Cape, A.B. initiatives were not needed. Santam and Sanlam were
thriving. Sanlam's actuary and manager M.S. Louw had long planned as expansion
out of insurance. As he told the Ekonomiese Volkskonqrest
"To be successful we must utilise the techniques of capitalism as
they are supplied in the.... goldmining industry. A finance company
should be started to function in industry and commerce like the
so-called finance houses of Johannesburg". (66).
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Louw's vision was to mobilise the savings of Afrikaner farmers and
workers in a central investment company, moving into industry and commerce. But
Sanlam did not possess the resources for such mobilisation on a national scale.
According t his biographer, Louw discussed this problem with "A.K. leaders"
(i.e. the A.B.) and in 1937 it established a commission of enquiry into the
economic conditions of Afrikaners. Its report argued the Eeufees would create
the necessary climate for an Ekonmiese Volkskonqres (people* s economic congress)
in 1939, with the prime function'of approving Louw1s scheme. (67) A committee
of prominent Cape Broers, Louw, Dr. T.E. DSnges (A.B. vice-chairman during the war)
and Dr. C.G.W. Schumann;was appointed to draft proposals for the investment
company. On their advice, Sanlam agreed to underwrite the share-issue. Again,
this opfly Southern dominance is interesting. Though long concerned with economic
issues, the Northern petty bourgeoisis could not summon the expertise to initiate
such a major undertaking - and was forced to rely on Sanlam for capital, planning
and staff.
The Eeufees did generate popular enthusiasm for an economic movement. In
a powerful speech before the waggons in Bloemfontein, Dr. J.D.(Vader) Kestell
proposed the establishment of a massive, central, reddingsdaad fund to rescue the
volk from poverty. His theme, Vn volk red homself, (anation rescues itself)
became the motto of the economic movement, though the £150,000 eventually
collected in the reddinqsdaadfonds fell short of Dr. Kestell's multi-million
pound vision. The first Ekonomiese Volkskonqres was convened in October 1939
after the Bond had ratified its :>roposais; A t least eighteen of the twenty-two-
man Kongres-committee were Broers. The strategy enunciated was threefold: to
coordinate and tap Afrikaner resources in savings and consumption; thereby to
foster finance capital, filtering control of the means of production downwards
and, through control of the state, to extend the network of infrastructural
public corporations. Clearly class mobilisation threatened the whole basis of
this strategy. Thus the cultural and political struggle were seen as critical
elements of the economic struggle, and the organisational network which developed
lent itself to both. (68)
Three broad organisations grew out of the Kgngres. Federale Volksbeleggings
(FVB) was established as the official investment company. The sale of FVB shares
occasioned much conflict with other entrepreneurs trying to raise capital from the
volk, jealous of its official status. Sanlam had ultimately to take up a large
percentage of the shares it had underwritten, giving it effective control of the
company. An Ekonomiese Instituut of the F.A.K. was also formed to coordinate
policy for the economic movement. The Instituut was the A.B. economic policy-
making body, establishing, thirdly, the Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) under Dr. Diedrichs
designed to mobilise mass support through a wide range of economic and cultural
activities, and "re-educate" the Africaner economically. By 1946 the RDB had
64,771 members in 381 branches, though its membership fell off rapidly after the
war. (69) Within the Dond pressure developed for an organisation specifically
for Afrikaner businessman. After an "investigation" by the Ekonomiese Instituut
(i.e. A.H.), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was formed by the RDR in 1942. The
growth of this purely bourgeoisie organisation was to alter the role of the
Ekonomiese Instituut which lost its broad policy-making function to the Handels-
instituut. After 1942, rather than just within the A.B. itself, policy was now
formulated by this specifically capitalist grouping. Though also dominated by
many A.B. members, the Handelsinstituut was never a simple Bond front like the
F.A.K. As a specifically class organisation, it fo stered the interests of that
class rather than the volk. Heavily influenced by the power of Southern groups,
the HandelF.instituut developed a real autonomy, independent of the wider concerns
of the Bond. This at times brought its capitalists into open conflict with the
A.B. and the HNp/v, particularly on later issues.
During the forties, the policy of the A.B.- coordinated economic movement
was to assist the formation of as many Afrikaner enterprises in as many fields as
possible. In numerical, terms, this was highly successful. The number of
Afrikaner-owned manufacturing establishments rose from 1,293 to 3,385, 1939-49,
with a turnover increase from £6m to £43.6m. The number of commercial-under-
takings rose from 2,428 to 9.585, turnover increasing from £28m to £203.7m.
Financial undertakings, too, increased from 40 to 68, the value of administered
funds raising from £27m to £74.4m. Yet many of these were small and under-
capitalised, floundering in the fifties. Afrikaner trading concerns particularly
were hard hit by the falling rate of profit in retailing. (70) The problem of
small undertakings was recognised by both the Handelsinstituut and the A.B. At a
second Ekonomiese Volkskonqres in October 1950, it was claimed the Reddingsverk
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of the first had been achieved. A\ subtle shift,in.. emphasis occuri!ed.lilOL<long«r was the
stress on frenetic establishment of new undertakings, but on consolidation of
existing ones, particularly financial institutions whose capital could ensure
healthy growth. The second Kon^res marked an important shift in the ideology of
Afrikaner capital - a movement away from the petty bourgeois competitive ethic
towards an acceptance of monopoly and its underlying class relations. It marked
the opening of a real division between a new bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie,
which gathered force in the Nationalist politics of the fifties and sixties. And
because it was again in the Cape that the majority of the more successful under-
takings established themselves^ hese class divisions continued to take the form
of regionalism. (71)
Thus the three-fold attack of A.B. activity - ideological redefinition,
the trade union assault and the economic movement - developed its own dynamic
during the war, partly taking it out of the Bond's control. The war itself
marked a shift in South African politics. Rapid changes in the structure of
production brought the contradictions of South African capitalism bubbling to the
political surface. Intensified political struggle centered on a confrontation
between capital and the state faced by an increasingly organised and militant
black proletariat. Such a profound division clearly brought into political
question the entire ideological and political structure of a system of exploitation
based on the racial division of labour. The 1948 election was fought on this
issue. These developments touched the position of all classes in the social
structure, clearly affecting the material interests of the groups the Bond was
trying to mobilise. Farmers were pressurised by acute labour problems, white
workers threatened by black proletarian militancy. The operations of the
Broederbond profoundly altered the ideological framework and class nature of
Afrikaner Nationalism. In a fundamental sense they shaped a class alliance
offering apparent solutions to the political crisis of South African capitalism,
and a distinct alternative to the monopoly interests represented in the United
Party. Each of the three areas of operation outlined above were fundamental to
the shaping of this alliance and critical to the slim electoral victory of 1948.
Though the A.B. was the shadow behind this new Afrikaner Nationalism, it
cannot really be said the Bond "did" anything at all. It did not act organisationally
but rather decided what should be done - formulated policy which other mandated
organisations or individuals implemented. Though the guiding force which brought
Afrikaner Nationalism to power, its internal and external relations were stormy,
reflecting the class divisions within Nationalism. It is important too not to
underestimate the independent role of the Party. The HNP/V was no m«r« Broederbond
front, but the central organisation of the Afrikaner Nationalism the Bond tried
to coordinate. En it were represented all the clav* forces of that Nationalism,
whilst the A.B. only ever represented Bourgeois and petty bourgeois groups.
Ironically, the party was to end up dominating the Bond. Under Malan and Strijdom,
an important, formal independence was maintained between the two organisations.
But for a variety of reasons to do with-the class conflict within the party,
Verwoerd began a process which undermined the Bond's independence allowing Vorster
to convertJJ: into a "support organ" of the party itself - a party now dominated by
the capitalists over most of whose birth the Broederbond had so anxiously hovered. (76)
Ifotes:
• • ™^~
XoRand Daily Kail, 6/3/65-
2o Report of the gommission of Kncuiry into Secret Qrganisations, (R.P.
20/1965) peras 56-7 (hereafter the Botha commission.). The Commission recei
ved the "full cooperation " of the 3ond. The then A.3. Chairman recommende
its report as "the truth" and "full story" on the Bond, Interview 10/6/75o
3. A.B. Constitution, clause 4c, quoted in Die Nederduitsch Kervormde Kerk
en die Afrikaner Brroederbond, submitfed to the General Synod 23/4/64,
Chapeter III, Section 15 Thereafter the Oelofse Report). This too quotes
$dm many voluntarily given -official A.B. documents. Unless otherwise
noted, all translations in this paper are mineo
4o The work of many Afrikaner historians falls into thds category. One
prominent author has expressed his belief in Divine appointment for this
task* See "Voorwoord" to G.3). Scholtz, Die Ontv/ikkeling van die Politieke
Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel I, 1652-1S06, (Johanne s burg, 1967) o
5. Again much "English" writing on Afrikaner Nationalism is little more th:
disguised Boer-bashing, based on conspiracy theories. Sg« W.H. Vatcher
Jro, White Laa^sr, (London 1965).
6. Some honourablle exceptions are IVi. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South
African Opposition 1939-1945, (Cape-E>wn, 1945), and T. Dunbar ivioodie, The
Rise of Afrikanerdom (Berkley 1975)•
7. P. Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (U.Calif. Press,
1967)p. 267. Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmonds-
worth, 1967) does introduce the concept, of class, but a^to impose;;it on
racial/cultural categories without an explication of the relationship,
producing a conspiracy view of Afrikaner Nationalism, hoodie op.cit.
partly explores the relationship through anpf examination of the generation
of ideology within the cultural context of the "civil religion" of "Afrik-
anerdom". Yet the explanation remains at the level of ideas* The acquisitic
and transmission of "civil religion" and the reception of ideology by mass
groups after formulation by an elite remain unexplored beyond assuming a
naturalness of action in cultural terms,
8. One recent paper has gone so far as to argue historians must accept the
categories and concepts handed on by sociologists and economists, themsele.
pliaying no role in the formulation of their s-nalytical tools: N. Garson.
"Race Relations and Closs Conflict as Factors in South AfricaF His^Pbry^V
University of the Witv/atersrtmd, September 1974. Moodie op.cit. and Irving
Hexham "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism" Coll-
ected Seminar Papers Vol I, Centre for Southern African Studies, York Uni-
versity 1975, pp 8-25, explore the development of Afrikaner Nationalist
ideology, but both have been heavily concerned with the theological inputs
of Calvinism and tend to take ideology at its face value.
9. But cf, T. Dunbar r.;oodie, "The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism as an
Immanent Critique of Marx's Theory of Social Class'/ African Studies Insti-
tute^ University of the ;/itv/atersrand, 27 October 1975.
. r
10. In my use of terms such as "Afrikaner petty bourgeoises" of "Afrikaner
capital", it is not their ethnic character which is determinant, They are
defined first not by the fact of being "Afrikaner", but by the specific
relationship to the means of production. The "Afrikaner" character may, in
distinct historical epochs separate^specific class fractions at the polit-
ical level, precisely because of the nature of the intervention of the
political instance in South African history. r,:y use of class analysis in
no way suggests that "Afrikaners" constituted a separate class, but that
for specific historical reasons, Afrikaans-speaking fractions of various
classes came to have their interests artiuulated under one apparently
supra-class, Nationalist, rubric,
lloDescription of the Bond's formation, Rapport 24/9/'72<, OKlofse Report p7-&
3.T2. See Biography of their first Chairman, N.J. le Roux, W.A. HofmeyeriSy
flferk en V/aarde (Cape Town, 1953) Pg- 125; £,P. du Plessis, 'n Volk Staan Of
((Jape Town 1964) Pg. 57; and the Cape Patty's offical history, pie Nasione
Party: Sy Opkoms en Oor-.vinning- Kaapland se Aandecl, pp 35-45. '
13. Veg, November 1968
14. S. Pauw, pie Beroepsarbeid vanjl die Afrikaner in die Stad (Stellenbosc
1946 )_p 217-2T51
15- Le Roux op-cit. p^ 91- See also Van Rooyen loc.cxt.
para 32.
17. L.J. du Plessis, The Star, 12/10/48. This is not the Prof. L.J du Pies
sis, a loading Broer for 30 years. Ironically, the first person to address
the Bond was J.ii. Hofmeyer. Unfortunately the subject of the address is nc
knowat Interview with founder member, L.E.3 Van Niekerk, Rand Daily Hail
24/1/64o
18. Oelofse Reportj pa£y 7. 19. Undated Military Intelligence Repor
(From internal evidence, 1944) "Die Afrikaner Broederbond" Section V, para
4, i & ii: V/itwatersrand university Archives, A.l.}iofiueyer Papers, file Ce
(hereafter the Hofmeyer papers).
20. "Who governs South Africa: The People vs. the Broederbond"Hofmeyer
Papers© 21. Oelofse op.cit. pg, 8; du Plessis op» ci
Die Afrikaner Broederbond" Section V, 5, i&ii, Hofmeyer Papers
22. Discussion of the "four purges" in A.B. history, Sunday Times 5/11/72?
•Die Afrikaner Broederbond" Section V, paras 6,7 & 8, Hofmeyer Paperso
23- Oelofse Report Chapt III, Section 17, paras 11-56, on organisational
structure. On selection procedure, Ibid Section 16, paras 2-9. On VrygesteQ
Broers, Section 17 Para 36e. The c-uoted former member who wishes to remain
annonyraous was interviewed Jutfe 1975«
24./yTnis lormer 20 year member had feeen chairman of his division.
25. iviilitary intellagnece Report dd 29/3/1944, Section V, Hofraeyer Paper?;
A.B Secretary 1.;.-.. Lombard, Die Transvaler 14/12/44, 20/12/44, 30/12/44 &
3/1/45;on the 1972 breakdown, Sunday Times 28/1/73, cuoting allegedly offi-
cial documents whose veracity v/as unchallenged. By 1972, Broers in most of
these occupational groups were in very influential position, not necessari;
conveyed by the arbitrary categories. The 1,691 "educationalists" eg.
broke dov/n into 24 University and College Hectors, 171 professors, 176 lec-
turers, 468 headmasters and 121 school inspectors. 'She 210 politicians
comprised, The State president, the Prime Minister, 19 Cabinet and Deputy
Ministers, 79 BUP.'s, 28 Senators, 69 k.P.C.'c and 13 Party organisors.
The editon of the Hers^tigte IJasionale Party organ, Die Afrikaner, claimed
the influx of businessmen "changed" and "weakened" the A.B. Interview wii&j
B.M. Schoemsn, 30/6/75• On the/shift in occupational dominance and the
increasing bourgeois control of the Bond, see B.M. Schoeman, Vorster se
1000 Dae (Pretoria 1974) and Vex, loc. bit. This view is corroborated in
J.P.H. Ssrfontein Die V^rkrampte Aanslag (Pretoria, 1970). The former A.B.
Chairman Or. P.J. y.eyev agreed that tha Borld had "moved with the times", nc
largely controlled by businessmen. Interview 10/6/75.
26. CIDauses 2-4 A.B. constitution, Oelofse Report, Cahpt. Ill, Section 15;
A.B. Secretary in Die Transvaler, 3/1/45.
27. Prof. L.J. du Plessis, Koers, Vol II, No. 1, Augusts 1934.
28. Quoted Botha Commission para J9. 29. Interview, June 1975.
' :
30» "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", section V, para 15» Hofmeyer papers.
31. Undated Military Intelligence Chart (probably 1943), Hofmeyer Papers;
Sunday Times 28/l/73. Those committees include: Kon-v.hite affairs; planning
youth; tho prf;sa; econoiaiu affairs; tw^riculture; Africa; religion; interna-
tional affairs; relations v-ith the on^lish; sport;e.nd technical and natural
sciences.
.. Botha Commission para 62; A.3. Omsendbrief 4/43/44, p^ra fy Sunday
&es 26/5/63; hoodie op<,cit. pg. 102.
33. The Sunday Times in fact inspired the formation of an anti-A<»B. Nasioi
-istebond based on this resentment. See eg. 15/12/63.
34. Military Intelligence report dd 29/3/1944, Section VI, Kofmeyer Paper:
35. G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van-.'.der Merwe, (Johannesburg 1944
v
 p# 99 J&l "Die Afrikaner Broederbond11 Section V, para J8.
37. Article by A.3, Secretary acknowleging Parternity of F.A.K, Dip Trans
yaler 30/13/1944, and A.B. And F.A.K. Chairman, Prof. H.3. Thorn Im^
Heferate" van die Jubileum Kongres van die F.A.K. (Johannesburg 1959)» pg
9. Koodie,op.cit. draws a useful distinction between the Bond's kultuur-
pol'itiek and the partypolitiek of the period.
38. A.B. Chairman to 1932 Bondsraad, quoted by Gen. Hertzog, Rand Daily
rail, 8/11/1935.
39. Irving Hexham op«cit. in fact argues the Gereformeerde influence was
paramount in the formulation of Afrikaner Nationalism. This I think over-
states the case and certainly overemphasised the "ideological". The Uni-
versity of Potchefstroom for Christian Higher Education is officially
Gereforrneerdet the Gereformeerde Kerk being the most rigidly conservative
of the three major Afrikaner Calvinist .Churches. The others are the large
Nederduitsch Gereforaeerde Kerk (hereafter N.G.K.) and the Nederduitsch
Hervormde Kerk.
40. See letter from the Secretary of the "Royal Order of Scotland" to J.H.
Kofmeyer, dd 17/8/48 and "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, paras 9 .
10, both in the Hofmeyer Papers.
41. Of the 5 Northern Gesuiwerde K.P.'s, 2 represented urban constituency
Three were lawyers, one a theologian, w.nd the single fanners was Chairman
of the Free State Chambers of Commerce.
42. Koers, Vol I, No. 1, August 1933. 43. Ibid*
t 44. Volkshandel, XI, 7, September 1950.
45. Eg. Hertzog1s Smithfield Speech November 1935, English version Rand
Daily Hail 8/11/35» and Foruteen Principles of the O'*?.S. Nationalist tar;
Van Rooyen op.cat. Hertzog finally retired from politics on the issue of
who were "Afrikaners"„
46. On N.P, attitude towards the organisation of Afrikaner Workers by the
Labour Party, see the official, Die Nasionale Boek (Johannesburg 1931) 1QL
47. For a detailed analysis of the differences in and between these group;
see Hoodie op.cit. Chapts, 2, 4 & 6»
480 Statement by the A.3. Chairman and Secretsry, Die Transvaler 14/12/44
49- Die Oosterlig 8/11/37. I am grateful to Prof, hoodie for -th-is C£uots.
30. ?:M:°. L.J. du Ples-c-is- at the Ekonftonfese Volkskongres, quoted E.P du
Plessis op.cit. pg. 104. ft
51- Die Burger 23/1/1942. The child of the Bond's eenheidskomittee desig:
-ed to reconcile the OsKe'.va Branfraft and' the Party under the Chairmanship OJ
Prof. L.J. du Plessis, the Draft attracted strong hostility groin Cape
interests. Southern republicanism did not rest on the Krugerite tradition
of the North, but pragr.rtic anti-imperialisrn. The O.B's premature publica-
tion of the Draft in fact provided the sour to the final rjftwiih telterty •
52. See the editorials in the first issue of each, Inspan Get.1941,
VoUkshandel, Karen 1940,
53- On this point, with reference to another group of South African petty
Bourgeoise ideologists, sec- Belinda Bozzoli, "The Origins, Development
and IdeoIlO5;y of Local :•. anuf&ctaring in South Africa", Jnl. of Southern
African Studies, I, 2, April 1975, pp 194-5.
